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Strategic planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
has been a source of criticism due to the lack of quality
and timely military advice needed by the National Command
Authorities (NCA) . The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act made
organizational changes to help solve JCS planning problems,
but failed to address other fundamental problems such as the
lack of Presidential participation in planning, the lack of
recognition of strategic role of today's information
technology in joint strategic planning and the lack of
training and experience of planning officers. This thesis
provides a high-level overview of both the Joint Strategic
Planning System (JSPS) currently being revised, and the
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)
designed to improve deliberate planning by the unified and
specified commanders. Conclusions and recommendations are
given to address the DoD's decentralized and incompatible
planning systems currently in use, and to improve the flow
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"The principal organizational goal of DoD, both in 1949
and now, is the integration of the distinct military
capabilities of the four Services to prepare for and conduct
effective and unified operations in fulfilling major U.S.
military missions." [Ref. l:p. 2] But over the past 20
years, there have been less than spectacular results of U.S
military operations that have been attributed to
organizational shortcomings such as inadequate joint
operations and joint planning [Ref. l:p. 15]. Examples
cited are the results of the Vietnam conflict during the
Johnson and Nixon administrations [Ref. 2:p. 222], the
attempted hostage rescue during the Carter administration
[Ref. l:p. 359], the attack on the U.S. Marines in Lebanon
[Ref. 2:p. 312] and the invasion of Grenada [Ref. l:p. 363],
the later two occurring during the Reagan administration.
The lack of satisfactory joint operations can be
illustrated most pointedly by the initial stages of
operation Urgent Fury, the 1984 invasion of Grenada:
...the U.S. units were poorly coordinated and ill prepared
for the invasion. The failure extended to every unit:
when a group of Delta Force commandos failed to take the
airport on the morning of the invasion, Ranger units had
to make an unexpected parachute assault on the island.
The subsequent failure of the Rangers to subdue the
airport's defenders meant that the airborne landing on the
afternoon of the 25th was unexpectedly contested. The
Marines who landed at Pearl were ordered to make an
amphibious assault on Grand Mai Bay because a SEAL (Navy
special operations) team had failed to rescue the governor
general; the assault took 24 hours, against light
resistance. Even more critical, intelligence officers
failed to locate the U.S. students on the island. The
last group wasn't rescued until the third day of the
invasion. It's now clear that the Cubans could easily
have shot the students had they desired. In addition,
some students later said that they only felt in danger
when U.S. units launched an assault to free them. [Ref.
2:p. 320]
The Department of Defense (DoD) agency that is
responsible for joint operations and joint planning is the
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) . In 1986
Congressional legislation passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act
in an attempt to improve joint planning. However, the JCS
has been slow to institute proper planning that would
provide the desired "joint" oriented military advice [Ref.
3:p. 12].
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis will address three areas in determining how
military planning and advice has been and could be improved.
It will identify (OJCS) planning problems. It will review
changes made to correct some of these problems. And lastly,
it will provide analyses of these and other potential
changes for long-term system viability in the OJCS.
1. Problems
The most critical and publicized problem concerning
the performance by the JCS, has been the JCS ' s inability to
provide adequate and timely cross-service recommendations to
the President and Secretary of Defense [Ref. 4:p. 8]. The
poor U.S. military performances during major operations
previously identified are the result of "organizational and
procedural problems that hamper it (OJCS) from fully
carrying out its responsibilities." [Ref. l:p. 157] Some
of the overall organizational and procedural problems
identified are:
• Insufficient OJCS Review and Oversight of contingency
plans [Ref. l:p. 206].
• Service-oriented vice joint-oriented military advice
[Ref. 5:p. 19].
• Ineffective and confusing chain of command.
• Inadequately defined national objectives by the
President [Ref. 5:p. 25].
This thesis will examine these and other major
problems with JCS joint planning efforts. And more
specifically, it will seek to identify areas pertaining to
Information Technology (IT) which have prevented DoD from
accomplishing timely and quality planning.
2 . Changes
In supporting the changes required by the Goldwater-
Nichols Act, two planning processes, short-range and mid-
range planning, are going through major revisions. Short-
range planning refers to the planning conducted by unified
and specified commanders covering the zero to two year time
period. Mid-range planning refers to the two to ten year
time period that is conducted by the JCS [Ref. 6:p. 106].
The following questions are asked: What changes have been
made to correct the stated problems within short-range and
mid-range planning? What do the planning systems look like
with these changes? And who, within short-range and mid-
range planning, has been effected by recent changes?
3 . Analysis
An ever-changing political and technological
environment may always require DoD changes. Therefore, the
questions must be asked: Are the changes that have been, or
that are in the process of being made, sufficient to solve
planning problems that have caused less than satisfactory
performances during military operations? And if they are
not sufficient, why not?
It is the contention of this thesis that there is an
underlying problem that must be addressed in addition to
implementing the changes directed by the Goldwater-Nichols
Act. This underlying problem concerns DoD's mismanagement
of information during planning, specifically at the JCS
level. The real issue is the lack of current information
systems which have prevented effective planning.
Ultimately, the question is how IT systems and IT management
can be changed or enhanced to improve joint planning.
B. STRUCTURE OF THESIS
The remaining chapters of this thesis are divided as
follows: Chapter II briefly describes the military planning
process prior to 1986, before changes resulting from the
Goldwater-Nichols Act were implemented. Chapter III
discusses the problems and related causes of the JCS
planning process. Chapter IV discusses the changes in the
planning process that have been or that are soon to be
implemented, specifically those involving responsibilities
of senior officials, mid-range planning, deliberate planning
and information technology. Chapter V is a discussion and
analysis of the changes described in Chapter IV. Chapter VI
provides conclusions and recommendations.
C. METHODOLOGY
The methodology for this thesis involved several steps
and processes. The first step consisted of gathering as
much information as possible concerning military strategic
planning conducted within the National Command Authorities
(NCA) and the JCS. As part of this data collection, the
associated problems that have surfaced due to ineffective
military operations were documented. After reviewing this
information, the next step was to describe how the current
strategic planning process was conducted.
Learning about the current procedures of strategic
planning by the JCS was difficult. The Joint Strategic
Planning System (JSPS) process/procedures are being revised
presently, and only an extremely small number of J-5
officials are familiar with the new initiatives. Because
current documentation has yet to be published referencing
the new procedures, interviews were conducted with JCS
personnel. Most of the interviews were conducted by phone,
but several were conducted in person.
A major source of information on the new military
planning process was the Joint Operation Planning and
Execution System (JOPES) conference (15-19 July 1989) . All
the documentation referring to the JOPES program addressed
in Chapter IV was obtained from this thesis trip. The
following sections list specifically the different
information sources used for this thesis.
1. Archival Records
The primary document used to gain the overall
conceptual picture of the mid-range planning, short-range
planning, the JCS organizational structure and the future
implementation of JOPES was the "The Joint Staff Officer's
Guide 1988." This document was referred to freguently to
look up definitions and general facts.
Two key documents that were instrumental in the
Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 were the
Senate Staff Report and the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) Report. Both stressed the
necessity for change in the defense organization. These
documents presented a thorough analysis of many apparent
problem areas that have slowly come to light because of
consistently inefficient and less than outstanding results
in military operations since the Vietnam conflict.
Recommended changes from these reports are listed in
Appendix G. Current opinions on the implementation of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act came from Dr. Hammond's paper
"Fulfilling the Promise of the Goldwater-Nichols Act In
Operational Planning and Command."
The viewpoints of the military officer planners were
obtained from two papers: "An Analysis of Joint Operational
Planning" and "Reforming the Joint Military Establishment."
No information could be found discussing information




Interviews were conducted in person and by phone.




• Five Joint Staff Officers: three from J-7, two J-5.
• One USTRANSCOM Officer.
• One OPNAV-605 Officer.
• One DCA official.
• Twenty-three interviews.
In person:
• Five Joint Staff Officers: three from J-7, two from
J-5.
• One retired J-5 Officer.
• One CEXEC Inc. Official.
• Eight interviews.
The interviews conducted with J-5 Officers concerned the
JSPS that is being revised and submitted for approval. The





The most important segment of the research for IT
information came from attending the JOPES conference which
was held at the Armed Forces Staff College. Because of
delays in the development of JOPES, the many changes that
the JOPES program has encountered, and the lack of any JOPES
reference material at the Naval Postgraduate School, the
JOPES conference became the sole source for information
involving future joint strategic planning goals.
Documentation of JOPES functional descriptions, support
elements and procedures description were critical in





A few documents were transferred by mail, but
correspondence by this method proved to be very slow. It
took approximately seven days to send or receive
correspondence to and from the Pentagon. A more efficient
and effective means to communicate was via the Defense Data
Network (DDN) . Difficulties occurred when JCS officials had
8
accounts on different networks, i.e., the WWMCCS Network.
One official in J-5 had an account on the DDN which made it
very easy to receive or send messages from my personal
computer at home. This proved more efficient primarily due
to the time difference between the Naval Postgraduate School
and Washington D.C..
II. DESCRIPTION OF JCS PLANNING PROCESS
The overall strategic planning process consists of three
systems, the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) , the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the
Joint Operating Planning System (JOPS) . They each
interrelate to produce outputs that include the President's
Budget (PB) , Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD)
,
tasking to combatant commanders (JSCP) and combatant
commander Operational Plans (OPLANs)
.
This chapter describes the processes, elements and
procedures involving these three systems as it exist today
and do not reflect the programs and proposals currently
being recommended/developed. These changes are discussed in
Chapter IV.
Prior to discussing these three systems, a brief
description of the functions and responsibilities involving
senior planning officials is provided. The functions and
responsibilities described are those before the changes
implemented by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, and are so
indicated.
A. DOD PLANNING OFFICIALS
There are numerous planning officials associated with
the JSPS and PPBS that are the cornerstone of military
10
planning and essential to the joint planning process. These
officials within the NCA and OJCS are the critical links who
integrate the different planning systems to create a
complete joint planning process.
1. NCA
The National Command Authorities consist of the
President and the Secretary of Defense who by law are the
only individuals with the authority to order troop movement
and/or direct the Armed Forces for the execution of military
action. [Ref. 6:p. 25]
2. OJCS
The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an
element within DoD that includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Joint Staff and the agencies of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. In 1953, two separate command channels were
established. An operational channel was established from
the Secretary of Defense, through the JCS, to the unified
and specified commanders. The second channel was the
support channel, that went from the Secretary of Defense, to
the military departments, to the unified and specified
commanders [Ref. 5:p. 14]. Before being revised by the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, the statutory responsibilities of JCS
included preparing strategic plans and direction of the
armed forces, establishing unified commands in strategic
locations, reviewing major material and personnel
requirements of the armed forces and formulating policy on
11
military eduction and joint training. These responsibili-
ties are summarized in Appendix A. The following sections
briefly describe three areas of the OJCS, the CJCS , the
Service Chiefs and the Joint Staff.
a. CJCS
In 1958 the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS), as senior military member of the JCS, was given the
authority to have a vote during JCS deliberations, and task
the Joint Staff on his own authority [Ref. 5:p. 14]. The
CJCS and the Service Chiefs combined to form a committee
that supplied the civilian leaders with military advice
[Ref. 5:p. 40]. In 1984, the CJCS was appointed as the
spokesman for the CINCs on operational reguirements [Ref.
5:p. 15].
b. Service Chiefs
The Service Chiefs, the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) , Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)
,
Chief of Staff for the Army (CSA) and the Chief of Staff for
the Air Force (CSAF) may offer advice to the President, NSC
and Secretary of Defense. They are responsible, to the
respective Service Secretary, for the management of that
Service, for appointing Operations Deputies of the JCS
(OPSDEPs) and Deputy Operations Deputies, JCS (DEPOPSDEPs)
who work with the Director and Vice Director of the Joint
Staff. As an integrative part of the staffing process, the
OPSDEPs and DEPOPSDEPs consider the less important issues or
12
screen the major issues to be forwarded to the Service
Chiefs. [Ref. 6:p. 36]
c. Joint Staff
Prior to 1986, the Joint Staff worked for the
corporate body of the JCS in developing required advice and
plans required to direct the unified operation of the
combatant forces [Ref. 5:p. 40]. Under the Director of the
Joint Staff there were five Directorates [Ref. 6:p. 38]:
• J-l: Manpower and Personnel Directorate.
• Directorate for the JCS Support (JS) , DIA.
• J-3: Operations Directorate.
• J-4 : Logistics Directorate.
• J-5: Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate.
B. JCS PLANNING PROCESS
The process of joint military planning is critical in
today's global environment in order to better utilize scarce
DoD resources not only during wartime, but also in
peacetime. Joint, mid-range, planning is attempted by
encompassing the JSPS and PPBS into an integrated planning
system that plans for the two to ten year time frame [Ref.
6:p. 6]. The overall process entails formulating politico-
military assessments; dictating proper planning guidance;
developing, testing, analyzing and choosing effective
strategic concepts and options; and appointing appropriate
forces and resources. These systems interrelate to form a
13
planning cycle aiding the senior decisionmakers in producing
military strategies/plans and accurate amounts of resources
(equipment and manpower) . The forces will in turn be able
to utilize necessary amounts of equipment, as applied to
developed strategies and plans, to achieve national
objectives when necessary.
1. JSPS
The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the
formal medium by which the CJCS carries out his
responsibilities involving strategy development and
providing strategic direction for the Armed Forces. The
JSPS feeds into the Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS) which produces a plan, a program and a budget
for the DoD. It broadly consists of a series of documents
providing assessments, resource allocations and planning
guidance. [Ref. 7:p. 2-8] A proposal to revise the JSPS is
currently being reviewed and is discussed in Chapter IV.
The publication referencing DoD's strategic planning process
is the MOP 84 "Joint Strategic Planning System."
The entire JSPS process has a six year cycle with a
new cycle beginning every other year. The overlap of the
processes is designed to instill flexibility into the
planning process, flexibility in the sense that updates of
any part of the cycle can be entered into an appropriate
process that is being executed. [Ref. 6: p. 103]
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In order to to collect, analyze and produce the
necessary information, six documents are produced
sequentially to facilitate the development of the the JSPD,
the JSCP (issued to the unified and specified commanders),
and to develop other critical inputs used within the PPBS
.
The following sections discuss the documents developed
within the JSPS and the staffing process involved in
developing JCS views.
a. IPSP
The Intelligence Priorities for Strategic
Planning (IPSP) is prepared annually by DIA and presented to
the CJCS. The IPSP contains CJCS advice to the Secretary of
Defense and Director of the CIA on military intelligence
requirements and priorities to support national objectives.
Tasking assignments are also contained to gather
intelligence required for the JIEP. [Ref. 6:p. 105]
b. JIEP
The Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning
(JIEP) consists of intelligence collected by the entire
intelligence community, including the CIA, DIA, Services and
CINCs that constitutes the intelligence basis for the JSPS.
The JIEP contains intelligence appraisals concerning global
and regional situation estimates of enemy forces and their
potential threat to U.S security interests. [Ref. 6:p. 105]
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c. JSPD
The Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD)
,
along with its three Supporting Analysis documents JSPDSA I,
II and III, are used in strategic and force planning. The
JSPD I tasks the CINCs in estimating minimum risk force
requirements needed to achieve national objectives. The
JSPD II contains the minimum risk force assessments
submitted by the CINCs. The JSPD III contains the planning
force required to execute national strategy. It considers
simultaneous conflicts, allied capabilities and U.S.
resources availability. The JSPD, prepared by J-5, is also
used to assess the POMs developed by DoD agencies. [Ref.
6:pp. 106-107]
d. JPAM
The Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM)
is the CJCS s view on the adequacy and the associated risks
of the total forces contained in the Service POMs to execute
national strategy. [Ref. 6:p. 321]
e. JSAM
The Joint Security Assistance Memorandum (JSAM)
,
prepared by J-5, contains CJCS ' s views on the funding levels
estimated for the security assistance programs prepared by




The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
contains guidance on military strategy and projected
military forces/capabilities that is issued to the CINCs for
short-range operations planning. [Ref. 6:p. 321]
2 . JCS Staffing Process
MOP 132 reguires a JCS staffing process to be
executed if a major JCS policy is to be determined, if
reguested by a JCS member or if one is likely to result in
the rejection of a CINC reguest [Ref. 6:p. 155]. The
following describes the complicated OJCS staffing procedures
illustrated in Figure 1. These procedures take place in
developing JCS positions on issues [Ref. 6:p. 156]. The
procedures can apply to developing JCS view during




Step one consists of the OJCS receiving a
reguest for JCS views from the White House, NSC, Secretary
of Defense, particular Joint Staff components, Federal
Agencies or CINCs.
b. Step Two
Step two involves the Director of the Joint
Staff reviewing the reguest and forwarding it to the
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Figure 1. Processing Joint Actions [Ref. l:p. 155]
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c. Step Three
Step three begins when the Directorate reviews
the request and assigns the request to an Action Officer
(Major/Lieutenant Commander or a Lieutenant Colonel/
Commander) . The Action Officer has the responsibility for
preparation of the draft paper that will eventually explain
the issue and propose appropriate solutions. Simultaneous-
ly, each Service is informed of the request. The OPSDEP
then assigns a Service staff Action Officer to work with the
Joint Staff Action Officer. Both the Directorate and
Service OPSDEP gives general guidelines to the action
officers indicating what the general contents of the paper
should entail.
The steps that follow are dependent on the
amount of time available, the magnitude of the task and the
relationships with previously developed views by JCS.
d. Step Four
Step four is performed if a rapid response time
is required. If a rapid response time is not required the
AO proceeds to step five. If a rapid response is required,
there are two options:
• If a recent assessment has been done involving the JSPS,
then the Joint Chiefs will forward this as their
response.
• If no prior assessment has been done, the Joint Staff
Action Officer and the Service staff Action Officer will
work closely with the Joint Staff Planner and Service
Staff Planner (Colonel/Captain) , their superiors, to
shorten the normal lower level iterative process. The
19
service Planner's responsibility is to their service in
the staffing process.
e. Step Five
Step five is completed if there is ample time
and no prior response has been developed. The Joint Staff
Action Officer and the Service staff Action Officer meet to
establish a schedule for preparing the response and discuss
the issue to be addressed. If there is time, inputs from
the appropriate unified or specified command will be
requested, otherwise the Joint Staff will attempt to
represent these viewpoints.
f. Step Six
After this meeting the Joint Staff Action
Officer begins step six and prepares the initial draft. The
staff of each Service or combatant command may write part of
this initial draft. A significant reason for this
participation is that the Service staffs are much larger and
have more data with related analysis to which the Joint
Staff does not have access.
g. Step Seven
Step seven has the Joint Staff Action Officer
and Service staff Action Officer meeting again to discuss
Service's positions relating to the content of the paper.
Suggestions on possible changes are discussed and the Joint
Staff Action Officer makes a second draft reflecting the
20
consensus of the meeting. Minority views not included can
be argued during the next step.
h. Step Eight
Step eight is the same as the previous step
except that it involves the Joint Staff and Service staff
planners, unless they were already involved in the previous
step. The planners create a third draft to represent the
consensus views and the Service planners forward it up the
chain of command, i.e., the Service planners send it to the
Service Operations Deputies.
i. Step Nine
Step nine reguires that the Operations Deputies
meet with the Joint Staff Director to discuss the paper. On
topics of lesser importance, the OPSDEPs, if in full
agreement, will approve the paper, enabling the Director to
sign and transmit it on behalf of the JCS. On major issues
or if there are remaining differences, the paper is sent to
the Chiefs of Staff.
j . Step Ten
Step ten, the last step, has the Chiefs of Staff
discuss the draft produced in step nine and make final
decisions. If, in a rare occurrence, there still remains a




The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS) is the cyclic process that determines the DoD portion
of the President's budget that is submitted to Congress.
The planning phase starts with the assessment of possible
threats and culminates with the development of force
objectives that will insure U.S. security. From the joint
perspective, the planning phase is initiated with the
submission of the JSPD to the Secretary of Defense for
Strategy and Option Review (SOR) . The President then makes
Strategy and Option Decisions (SOD) regarding the military
strategies proposed in the SOR which are then included in
the Defense Guidance (DG) . The DG, which ends the Planning
phase, includes firm guidance on goals, priorities,
objectives and fiscal constraints to be used in the
development of Service Program Objective Memorandum (Service
POMs) . [Ref . 6:p. 107]
The programming phase translates force objectives
into program force structures in terms of resource
requirements. From the DG, Service Secretaries submit
recommendations to the CJCS proposing specific applications
of their portion of the DoD appropriations. These
recommendations constitute the Service POMs. The CJCS
reviews the POMs to ensure that program recommendations are
consistent with and capable of achieving national strategy
objectives. Any alternatives or disagreements are
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incorporated into Issue Papers (IPs) and resolved by the
Defense Resources Board (DRB) with the results recorded in
the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) . [Ref. 6:p. 108]
The budget phase translates planning and programming
into annual funding requirements. The PDMs are distributed
to the DoD components for the formulation of Budget
Estimates. After review hearings are thoroughly conducted
by OSD, DRB, OMB and JCS Staff, the Program Budget Decision
(PBD) is formed and submitted to the President. From the
PBD, the President formulates the President's Budget (PB)
and submits it to Congress in January. The PB, consisting
of detailed appropriation recommendations for the upcoming
fiscal year, undergoes extensive Congressional reviews and
is hopefully passed by 1 October, the beginning of the
fiscal year. [Ref. 6:p. 110] Details involving the
Congressional reviews of the President's Budget is beyond
the scope of this thesis. A summary time line of the PPBS
and JSPS is illustrated in Appendix B.
C. DELIBERATE PLANNING
As opposed to the two to ten year time period that the
JSPS plans for, deliberate planning involves planning for
contingency operations within the zero to two year time
frame. Deliberate planning begins after the JSPD has been
published and the JSCP (the principal task-assigning
document) has been issued to the unified and specific
23
commanders. The JSCP assigns preparation of contingency
plans with the end product of this process being CONPLANS,
OPLANS and OPORDS . [Ref. 6:p. 137] Current deliberate
planning is conducted at the CINC level in five phases:
• Initiation Phase.
• Concept Development Phase.
• Plan Development Phase.
• Plan Review Phase.
• Support Plan Phase.
The deliberate planning process is supported by the
Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) . JOPS is the current
DoD directed and computer supportive system required to be
used for joint deliberate planning. JOPS enables unified
and specified commanders to translate JCS task assignments
into the developing, analyzing, refining, reviewing and
maintaining of CONPLANs, OPLANs and/or OPORDs. [Ref. 6: p.
134]
JOPS has gone through several updates since its
inception in the 1960s. The latest version of JOPS is a
system within the Worldwide Military Command and Control
System (WWMCCS) . WWMCCS interfaces with numerous systems
such as Nuclear planning and Execution (NPE) ; intelligence,
weather and logistics systems; and Tactical Warning/Attack
Assessment (TW/AA) and space defense systems [Ref. 6: p.
261]. WWMCCS ' s primary role is to support national-level
command and control operations, but it also supports the
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combatant commanders command and control operations on a
noninterference basis. Users are able to communicate with
other users via the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN)
.
[Ref. 6:p. 118] Further details of JOPS and WWMCCS is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
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III. PROBLEMS WITH JCS PLANNING PROCESS
The overall problem facing DoD today is the less than
satisfactory results from military operations. The causes
of these problems have been attributed to organizational and
procedural deficiencies within DoD [Ref. l:p. 1]. The
Senate Staff and CSIS Reports submitted in 1985 have
discussed these causes in depth [Refs. 4:p. 1; l:p. 614].
Therefore, a thorough analysis involving each major cause is
beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this chapter will
focus on one particular cause of defense problems, the
structural, procedural and IT problems associated with the
JCS planning process.
The JCS planning process has drawn widespread criticisms
for its failure to produce quality and timely integrated
military advice for the President and the Secretary of
Defense (the most important result from the JCS strategic
planning process) [Ref. l:p. 157]. It should be noted that
senior civilian officials generally view advice from senior
military officers as good when given individually. It is
the advice derived from the "corporate" structure planning
process that has been viewed as being inadequate [Ref. 5:p.
18] .
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A. STRUCTURAL AND PROCEDURAL CAUSES
In identifying the causes of improper military planning,
the military reform studies have directed most of their
analysis towards the organizational structure and
procedures. The following sections identify six significant
patterns.
1 . Lack of Policy Direction from the President
If joint military operations are a clear DoD
strategy, then an overriding problem that effects the
progress of joint planning/operations is the lack of clear
Presidential policy direction being given to the OJCS [Ref.
8]. In addition to national strategic guidance having a
tendency to be abstract, political leaders "are inclined to
leave policy unarticulated or ambiguous or even inconsistent
in order to avoid presenting their critics with clear
targets and their adversaries with reliable predictions
about future behavior." [Ref. 3:p. 39] This has certainly
left the Services to continue in planning and developing
their own policies and programs to meet Service "sub-goals,"
not joint oriented goals, for 18 Army divisions, 600 Navy
ships and 40 Air Force Wings.
The President, the military's Commander-in-Chief
(Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in corporate terminology)
must be the source from which clear strategic policy and
support emerges. The Goldwater-Nichols Act specified that
the "President shall transmit to Congress each year a
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comprehensive report on the national security strategy of
the United States." [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT. 1075] An
unclassified version of this report, referred to as the
National Security Strategy Report, was submitted in 1987 and
1988 under the Reagan administration, but was not submitted
in 1989 under the Bush administration. The 1988 and 1989
reports were criticized for being too generic in nature and
failing to prioritize national objectives [Ref 10:p. 3].
Well-defined policy emphasizing joint planning and
operations directed from the President would result in a
much more integrated, "joint" oriented and unified effort by
the various DoD components and personnel. But, not since
President Eisenhower's term has a formal document setting
forth clear and specific national objectives been delivered
to the DoD [Ref. 5:p. 25].
2 . Over-emphasis on Budgeting
There is an overly extensive focus by the Pentagon,
Congress and the media on the budget process. Civilian and
military officials simply focus all of their attention on
the material "inputs" which results in the insufficient
focusing on the "outputs" such as the guality of national
strategy and personnel, the preparation and evaluation of
OPLANs and the execution of national policy decisions.
[Ref. l:p. 620]
Each chamber of Congress reviews virtually every
line item of the defense budget at least three times
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annually. Within each chamber of Congress, a separate
committee controls the three annual reviews. This
redundancy on the upcoming year's budget not only results in
an excessive workload, but also undermines any rigorous
attempt to develop long-term plans and programs. [Ref. 4:p.
32]
Resource budgeting, being a separate decision-making
process, actually competes with, instead of supporting,
resource programming. This often results in less visible
programs, originally determined necessary during the
planning phase, not receiving OSD backing, and being
rejected or changed significantly. [Ref. 4:p. 39]
3 . Decentralized Structure
Tradition and history has created four strong
separate Services, each of which in the past has played
distinctly different and separate roles during military
conflicts. As a result, the JCS and CINCs have been unable
to overcome the powerful political strength of each Service
and remain constrained by the Service-oriented material and
forces provided to them [Ref. 5:p. 42]. Lieutenant General
John Cushman also comments, "Because the military services
and departments are the strong and enduring institutions of
the military establishments, the JCS have long been failing
the field commands in their harmonizing functions." [Ref.
5:p. 31]
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The Secretary of Defense, who is provided a full
measure of power over the DoD by formal statutory authority,
also lacks the actual power and influence to effectively
manage the DoD. He simply has not been able to overcome the
powerful institutional forces of the individual Services.
[Ref. l:p. 10]
Besides the difficulty in over-riding the political
strengths of the separate Services, the continuous growth of
the DoD to meet administrative and operational needs has
also made centralized managing of the DoD difficult. The
Secretary of Defense is responsible for managing an
organizational structure that is the largest and most
complex in the world. Within DoD there are 12 major defense
agencies consisting of approximately 1265 military
installation and properties and over five million personnel
(active duty, reserve and civilian employees) . There are
also over three million personnel in the private sector who
provide services and/or products to DoD. An organization
with such traditionally strong Services, and of such a
mammoth size, has made, in this author's opinion, any
attempt by OSD and OJCS to successfully perform integrative
planning extremely difficult.
A decentralized DoD was encouraged by President
Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger and was reflected
in the delegation of tasks and responsibilities to the
individual Services, thus allowing the Services to dominate
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the decision-making process [Ref. 3:p. 5]. An additional
factor causing the decentralized Services to dominate
decision-making is the "dual-hatting" responsibilities
within the JCS, where the Service Chiefs are also the Joint
Chiefs. This dual responsibility creates a conflict of
interest since a Service Chief must defend the programs and
interests of the Service he represents and also be able to
rule against those same programs in the interest of "joint"
priorities. Because the Service Chiefs frequently defend
their individual Service programs, many tough trade-off
decisions are not made. [Ref. 5:p. 21]
Decentralization is further enhanced by the number
of subordinates reporting to top DoD officials. The
Secretary of Defense has 41 senior military and civilian
officials who report directly to him, and the Service Chiefs
have between 35 and 48 senior officials reporting directly
to them. [Ref. l:p. 628] One individual can not
effectively manage the type of national issues required when
there are 30 to 40 senior officials reporting to him. This
situation only enhances excess delegation of authority and
responsibility that facilitates decentralization.
4 . Functional Organization Structure
The DoD organizational structure, particularly OSD,
is focused on functional areas such as research and
development (R&D) , manpower and policy. Mission outputs and
objectives are viewed at lower management levels within
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these functional areas. Therefore, joint oriented
objectives, strategies and mission capabilities are
represented at too low of a management level. This results
in critical DoD missions being viewed from a narrow, single
and decentralized functional perspective. [Ref. l:p. 614]
This type of structure, it appears, would only make it more
difficult to conduct top-down, integrated planning along
mission capabilities.
5. Lack of Integration
The primary uniformed official responsible for the
integrated military advice given to the President, NSC and
Secretary of Defense is the CJCS [Ref. 6:p. 35]. One of the
causes for ineffective JCS planning has been the inability
for the CJCS to fulfill his role as an integrator. Refer-
encing the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the following quote points
out the dual responsibilities of the CJCS:
Admiral Crowe, at least judging by his actions, has
interpreted this provision to mean that, as chairman, he
should be an advocate for the needs of each CINC. This
practice is consistent with the plainest meaning of the
statute yet is inconsistent with one of the main
objectives of the law, the provision that he should be the
principal military advisor to the secretary of defense.
He cannot be both principal advisor to the secretary and
advocate for each of the CINCs any more than he can be the
advocate of each of the services and adequately perform
his role as the principal military advisor of the
Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 3:p. 10]
As the principal military advisor, the CJCS must be able to
set priorities and choose among Service and CINC programs.
The inability to integrate Service plans and programs will
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certainly effect the military advice forwarded to the
President.
6 . By-passing Formal Process
Another visible pattern that indicates failure in
planning and that further deters DoD interoperability
involves making key decisions outside the normal process,
i.e., not following standard planning procedures by
eliminating required personnel during planning meetings
[Ref. ll:p. 11.7]. Since the military has, at least
perceptually, inadequately fulfilled their role in the
formulation of military strategy, the civilian components of
government have attempted to bypass the formal strategic
planning process. Former President Nixon had a secret
foreign policy decision-making quorum identified as making
critical national strategy and policy decisions without any
knowledge or participation from the OJCS [Ref. 2:p. 232].
Also, when President Reagan met with Gorbachev in Reykjavik,
Iceland to hold "nonsubstantive discussions" with the Soviet
General Secretary, the summit nearly resulted in negotiating
away 50 percent of all U.S strategic missiles. Unfortunate-
ly, even though the top Soviet military official was
present, Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Sergei F.
Akhromeyev, the top U.S. military officer, the CJCS, was not
invited to the summit to provide advice in such "nonsubstan-
tive discussions." [Ref. 2:p. 341]
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B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CAUSES
In addition to the causes previously listed, there are
also causes associated with military planners not having the
adequate analytical tools, i.e., modern computer hardware
and software systems, required to support the receiving,
assessing, changing and transmitting of timely and accurate
information required to develop accurate military plans
[Ref. 3:p. 18]. Current information systems do not allow
JCS planners to conduct joint strategic planning efficiently
or accurately with the amount of information required to be
handled [Ref. 12:p. 1-4].
Mainframes, personal computers and networking architec-
ture of just ten years ago can not meet today's enormous
amounts of information requirements to process more data
faster and more accurately. Also, hardware developed just a
few years ago can not operate the complex software programs
or satisfy real-time communication requirements. There is a
continuing need to update current hardware systems and
architecture in order to meet integrative planning
objectives. Information systems are available and must be
acquired to obtain, analyze and communicate more data faster
for planners over greater distances.
1. JOPS
The current system used for short-range military
planning, the Joint Operating Planning System (JOPS) , can
not meet the standards required by today's military
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planners. Because JOPS, developed in the 1960s, consist of
antiquated system design hardware and software, it is
incapable of both supporting the JCS planner in national
strategy planning and is also a system that is too slow,
cumbersome, expensive and extremely user unfriendly for CINC
planner utilization. It is a system that takes a great deal
of time to learn how to operate, and the reports and
information produced are not always what the user wants or
needs. [Ref. 12 :p. 1-4] Often, CINC planners must
communicate within JCS to receive guidance on how to apply
complicated functions of JOPS [Ref. 12:p. 111-16]
.
Despite reducing the time to produce an OPLAN from
two years to approximately twelve months, JOPS still
restricts the CINC planners from developing, integrating and
analyzing alternate solutions that may be more effective.
JOPS, because of the time restrictions and limited data
resources, does not enable the planners, at any level, to
maintain flexibility, i.e., develop alternative solutions
[Ref. 12:p. 1-4]. The systematic planning conducted by
strategy planners must require several options to be looked
at in a short period of time to maintain flexibility and
obtain the best choice(s) of action [Ref. 13:p. 89].
JOPS planning capabilities have never been expanded
to enhance the JCS planners in planning. JOPS supplies
results for best method (s) and actions to accomplish an
assigned task [Ref. 6:p. 128], but is designed to only
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assist the short-range deliberate and time-sensitive
planning process for the formulation of OPLANs, CONPLANs
(Operation Plans in Concept format) and OPORDs (Operation
Orders), not mid-range strategic planning within the JSPS.
2 . Data Redundancy, Dependency and Decentralization
The proliferation of information, including both
relevant and irrelevant data, has inundated the federal
government. Arguably, this has created the tendency to
conduct too much hands-on management to insure information
is being handled correctly. This "micro-management" has
caused a further reduction in the time available to provide
quality policy direction by our civilian leaders. Civilian
leaders, therefore, have less time to develop and forward
national objectives which further effects the ability of the
military to link force capabilities to national objectives
[Ref. 4:p. 9]. Despite the large effort to reduce paper
work and streamline planning efforts, the numerous levels of
management and the time required to access planning data in
an organization of more than 1600 global installations
results in extreme duplication of time consuming processes.
The fix all in the past has been to add more staffs and/or
extend time requirements to handle micro-management and the
increase in data. Continuously adding more people and
staffs has resulted in an even more bureaucratic, complex
and decentralized organization. [Ref. l:p. 145]
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What has been lacking in the past is DoD data
element standards that would reduce the unmeasurable amount
of data redundancy within the joint planning community, and
allow interoperability of DoD information systems. The
redundancy of data and the overlapping of uncountable
databases has created decentralization, and an absence of a
rational and realistic division of work. This has lead to
greater complexity, friction, delay, duplication and
inefficiency to the point that OSD, Congress and the
Services are encroaching on the planning duties assigned to
the OJCS. [Ref. l:p. 9] The failure to implement data
element standards has allowed all DoD agencies to continue
creating more and more incompatible information that further
decentralizes the overall organization.
What has significantly increased the planning time
for JCS planners has been their dependency on having to
access required planning data through individual Service
planners. JCS planners do not have the data available
directly from their databases and do not have random access
to Service databases. Therefore, planners are largely
dependent on the Service databases for their needs. This
increases planning time significantly and also potentially
bias the information actually given to the planners.
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C . SUMMARY
Joint operational and strategy mistakes in Vietnam,
Lebanon, Libya, and Grenada have been attributed to, in a
large measure, ineffective joint operational planning
according to key officials who were directly involved.
There have been attempts to overlook these mistakes and the
related causes because: [Ref. 5:p. iv]
• The joint operational capability has not been severely
tested or required since WW II.
• Operational defects tend not to repeat themselves
(making it difficult to find and correct problem
trends)
.
• Operational mistakes may be attributed to the realism of
war as to anything else.
Modern weapons have decreased significantly the time
required to transition to wartime doctrine and command and
control. Relying and allowing for the shift to an "ad hoc"
type planning organization in the transition to war is not a
satisfactory planning outlook. "Joint" planning and the
tools to conduct it quickly and accurately must be acquired
and utilized prior to an actual conflict.
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IV. PLANNING PROCESS CHANGES
The most recent Congressional effort to correct the
problems and related causes discussed in Chapter III has
been the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the goals of which were
to: [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT 994]
• Reorganize the DoD.
• Strengthen civilian authority.
• Improve military advice to the President, NSC and
Secretary of Defense.
• Ensure that proper authority and responsibilities are
given to unified and specified commanders for the
accomplishments of missions assigned.
• Increase attention to the development of strategy and
contingency planning.
• Provide for more efficient use of defense resources.
• Improve joint officer management policies.
This chapter discusses the changes being implemented to
correct the joint military advice/planning problems
associated with mid-range planning, short-range planning and
IT. A summary of the changes in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
Act and the recommendations of the 1985 Senate Staff and
CSIS Reports are summarized in Appendix C.
This chapter focuses on the two of the three systems,
JSPS and JOPS , that are currently undergoing major changes.
JSPS is awaiting approval of proposed recommendations, and
JOPES, designed to someday replace JOPS, is to begin
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implementation of the first version in late 1989. Also
discussed are the information systems changes that are being
initiated to insure interoperability of the JOPES program.
A. DOD PLANNING OFFICIALS
The NCA and OJCS planning officials associated with the
JSPS and PPBS are the critical links who integrate the
different planning systems to create a complete joint
planning process.
1. NCA
The National Command Authorities consist of the
President and the Secretary of Defense who by law are the
only individuals with the authority to order troop movement
and/or direct the Armed Forces for the execution of military
action. [Ref. 6:p. 25] The President is now required to
submit annually, to Congress, a comprehensive report on the
national security strategy of the United States [Ref 9: p.
100 STAT 1075] Also, OSD, specifically the Under Secretary
of Defense, is now required to submit annually to the JCS,
policy guidance concerning contingency planning [Ref. 3:p.
22] .
2. OJCS
The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an
element within DoD that includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Joint Staff and the agencies of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. In the role of formulating military advice, the
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Joint Chiefs of Staff has no executive authority over
combatant forces. The chain of command is from the
President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary
of Defense to the combatant commanders [Ref. 6:p. 32]. The
Goldwater-Nichols Act has directed changes to the CJCS and




The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, identified
under the Goldwater-Nichols Act as head of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, is now the principal military advisor to the
President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense. He may, and does,
consult with other JCS members and combatant commanders in
formulating military advice. He then presents the range of
advice received from the other JCS members to the NCA. The
CJCS is the communication link between the NCA and the
combatant commanders, and also acts as spokesman for the
combatant commanders concerning requirements, programs, and
budgets. [Ref. 6:p. 34] A summary of the CJCS s functions
is listed in Appendix D.
b. Joint Staff
The Joint Staff assists the CJCS with the
unified operation of the combatant forces, the integration
of the three services into an efficient team and unification
of the strategic direction of these combatant forces. With
a desire for a more centralized organization by a growing
number of civilian officials, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has
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frozen the number of personnel within the Joint Staff and is
now restricted to 1627 military and civilian personnel.
Under the Director of the Joint Staff, who assists the CJCS
in managing the Joint Staff, J-7 and J-8 have been added to
now create seven Directorates (see Appendix E)
:
J-l: Manpower and Personnel Directorate.
Directorate for the JCS Support (JS) , DIA.
J-3: Operations Directorate.
J-4 : Logistics Directorate.
J-5: Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate.
J-7: Operational Plans and Interoperability
Directorate.
J-8: Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment
Directorate.
B. MID-RANGE PLANNING
This section discusses JCS mid-range planning,
specifically the JSPS. The time line located in Appendix F
illustrates the documents that are developed and actions
that are taken during the proposed JSPS process. Steps
involving the budget process, and the President's submission
of the annual budget, have also been included in the time
line to illustrate how strategic planning theoretically
precedes fiscal planning.
The proposal to revise the JSPS would consolidate
numerous documents and simplify, at least conceptually, the
overall JSPS planning process, and is currently under review
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for approval. Once approved, the JSPS would consist of the
following steps. [Ref. 14]
The initial step of the JSPS is the Joint Strategy
Review (JSR) . Inputs from the Services, CINCs and
intelligence sources such as DIA assess current DoD
strategy, potential threats and global political conditions.
The JSR is summarized in the publishing of the Joint
Military Net Assessment (JMNA)
.
From the JMNA the CJCS formulates his guidance, the
Chairman's Guidance (CG) . J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy)
of JCS receives the CG from the CJCS and begins an iterative
process of developing and assessing strategy options. The
resulting options are incorporated into the development of
the NMSD. The NMSD provides strategic planning and force
structure advice to the President.
From the NMSD, J-5 produces the JSCP and forwards it to
the combatant commands for the development of concept and
operational plans within short-term/deliberate planning.
The MOP 84 document is currently being revised to
reflect these new procedures and documents, if approved. A
draft copy of the revised MOP 84 was unavailable during the
writing of this thesis.
C. DELIBERATE PLANNING
The following changes have been proposed in the
deliberate planning process. Deliberate planning would
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start after the NMSD has been published, the Secretary of
Defense issues contingency planning guidance (PGCP) to the
JCS and the JSCP has been issued to the unified and
specified commanders. Another major change would be the
application of JOPES to the deliberate planning process.
The JOPES program currently being developed would consist of
seven new phases that would, in conjunction with JOPES,
significantly reduce the time required to produce OPLANs and
OPORDs.
1. JOPES
In order to correct the military planning and
execution deficiencies that have occurred since Korea, an
effort began 12 years ago to build a system that would
replace current planning and execution tools. The Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) , which J-7
of the JCS is the main proponent and the Defense
Communications Agency (DCA) is the implementing agency, is
the follow-on system that intends to integrate the two
current deliberate and time-sensitive planning and execution
systems, JOPS and JDS (Joint Deployment System) [Ref. 6: p.
251] .
JOPES will be formed into a system designed
primarily to satisfy the information needs of senior-level
decision makers in conducting joint planning and operations.
[Ref. 6:p. 251] By supporting the national (level I),
theater (level II) and supporting organizational (level III)
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levels, JOPES will give "collateral" support to the JSPS and
PPBS [Ref. 6:p. 252]. As the joint command and control
system for conventional operation planning and execution,
JOPES will address the DoD mission areas of mobilization,
deployment and sustainment by supporting capabilities that
include [Ref. 15:p. ES-1]:
• The transmission of timely and accurate information on
the status and location of forces and major resources.
• The speedy development and implementation of operation
plans and options.
• The formulation and transmission of direction to, and
the receipt and assessment of reports from appropriate
commands and organizations. [Ref. 6:p. 261]
In relation to the JSPS and the PPBS, the functions
of JOPES begin upon the issuance of military tasks contained
in the JSCP. The functions then continue through option
selection and the development of courses of action (COAs)
,
OPLANs and OPORDs . The functions end when the plan is
cancelled, the operation ends or the crises is resolved.
Under JOPES the process of developing a detailed, fully
integrated implementation plan of the approved COA will only
be completed when reguired. The basic details reguired
would have already been completed and approved in the COA
development. [Ref. 6:p. 255]
a . GOALS
"The principal goal of JOPES is to develop one
set of procedures for both deliberate and time-sensitive
planning." [Ref. 6:p. 253]. With the two plans
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differentiated by only the length of the planning cycle,
JOPES will enable the combatant commanders to be more
responsive to NCA and CJCS guidance on military operation
planning, deliberate or time-sensitive. One of the primary
objectives of the JOPES project is to enable theater level
commanders to develop OPLANS, when required to be developed,
within 45 days [Ref. 6:p. 253]. This capability takes
tremendous pressure off the planners regarding time
management and allows them to devote more time to test
different options, review possible plans and review
potential requirements. The planners were previously unable
to conduct in-depth planning reviews since OPLANS were
taking up to 24 months to develop. Other goals include:
• Provide a smooth transition from deliberate planning to
actual execution [Ref. 15:p. ES-7].
• Permit theater commanders to more effectively and
rapidly manage military operations.
• Standardize policies and procedures that will be similar
during peacetime, wartime, or crisis situations.
• Support rapid development and evaluations of military
options and COA's.
• Utilize ADP and communications technology advances.
• Ensure the dissemination and presentation of timely,
accurate, and properly aggregated information.
• Allow planners to identify resource shortfalls. [Ref.
15:p. ES-2]
Achieving these goals is possible with proper intelligence
information and analysis support covering the period of the
operation plan (e.g., one year). JOPES, unlike JOPS, will
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integrate strategic and current intelligence into each phase
through intelligence database/systems interfaces [Ref. 7:p.
2-13]. This function was previously not possible due to the
various intelligence resources not having automatic data
base system integration capabilities to support JOPS [Ref.
7:pp. 2-12].
JOPES will update the current user-unfriendly,
time consuming and incompatible information systems with
more efficient systems that include modern automated data
processing (ADP) , communication hardware and a functional
architecture consisting of an integrated database, data
management, decision models and presentation choices [Ref.
7:pp. 2-24]. JOPES will be an overlay to numerous
subsystems that are now being developed via the prototyping
process. Version 1, as opposed to previously used terms
consisting of releases, blocks and increments, is planned to
be introduced at the end of 1989 with subseguent versions
implemented approximately every six months [Ref. 16].
2 . Revised Deliberate Planning Phases
As previously mentioned, the phases that constitute
deliberate planning are being revised under JOPES [Ref. 6:p.
253]. The new phases will be seven interrelated functions
that will include monitoring, threat identification and
assessment, strategy determination, COA development,
executive planning, implementation and simulation and
analysis. The JOPES planning cycle will be initiated with
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the JSCP (JCS issuing specific tasks) and culminated in the
development of an approved COA. It is envisioned that
detailed OPLANS will be prepared only when required by the
NCA, JCS, or the CINCs [Ref. 15:p. 1-3]. Only CONPLANs
submitted for JCS approval will be required at this stage
due to the capability of JOPES functions formulating an
OPLAN in 45 days, vice the approximately 12 to 24 months it
currently takes, and OPORDs within three days of NCA COA
selection [Ref. 15:p. ES-1]
.
a. Monitoring
The Monitoring function will allow users to
obtain information concerning friendly, enemy and neutral
forces and resources. Data from unit, base and command
levels will be processed to provide consumption, attrition
and utilization information. Through continuous
intelligence collection, collation and evaluation,
interrelated databases will be updated automatically as data
is entered into the system [Ref. 7:pp. 2-23].
b. Threat Identification and Assessment
The Threat Identification and Assessment
function will involve detecting actual or potential threats.
After appropriate decisionmakers are notified of the threat
and of the threat's the capabilities and intentions, this
function will supply information for strategic planning at
the national level and courses of action at the theater





























































Figure 2. Threat Identification and Assessment Process
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in the Threat Identification and Assessment phase. Threat
identification will involve the following procedures: [Ref
15:p. III-5]
Monitor and evaluate the situation.
Problem recognition.
Evaluate impact.
Identify threat to national interests.
Identify intelligence tasks and reguirements.
Assess intelligence assets.
Adjudicate intelligence asset shortfalls.
Redirect Intelligence collection.
Collect and analyze data.
Develop and publish intelligence estimate,
c. Strategy Determination
Strategy determination, as applied to the
deliberate planning process by combatant commanders, is
supported by JOPES to not only assist the theater level
decisionmaker during deliberate and/or time-sensitive
planning, but also assists the NCA, NSC and JCS in
formulating viable objectives and options to counter the
threat. This function will involve formulating politico-
military assessments, developing strategic concepts and
options, apportioning forces and other resources, and
formulating planning guidance. [Ref. 6:p. 254] These are
the elements that will lead to the development of COAs,
CPLANs, and OPORDs. Planners will use the forces and
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resources specified in the JSCP, JCS orders, Service
capabilities documents and previously approved OPLANs (or
COAs when available) in utilizing this function. [Ref.
15 :p. 1-7] Figure 3 provides a breakout of requirements
necessary to support this JOPES function that involve:
[Ref. 15:pp. 111-12— 111-25]
• Analyze national strategic guidance.
• Review and assess current situation and historical data
• Develop strategic concepts.
• Develop and test options.
• Approve and recommend options.
• Prepare and issue guidance.
It should be noted that these procedures, though only
involving short-range time frame, are similar to the
procedures carried out during the (mid-range) joint
strategic planning system previously discussed.
In determining an appropriate strategy, the JCS
collaborates with the Services and supported commands in
analyzing relevant information. Such information would be
derived from National Security Decision Directives (NSDD)
,
the NMSD, and the DG [Ref. 15:p. ES-9]. Other data sources
are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) , Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) , etc. The Strategy Determination
function will focus on short term strategy requirements and
will assist the NCA and JCS in formulating suitable and
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Figure 3. Strategy Determination Process
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To accomplish this objective, the individual processes will
enable the user to assess politico-military information,
develop and evaluate military strategy and objectives,
apportion resources, formulate concepts and military options
and develop planning guidance that will allow the theater
level commander to then develop courses of action. [Ref.
15:p. 1-14]
To satisfy the deliberate planning functional
requirements in the areas of strategy determination, J-5
will submit sub-JSEs (JOPES Support Elements) that address:
[Ref. 16:Part II, p. 2]
• Political-Military Assessment Process.
• Option Generation Process.
• Guidance Preparation Process.
• War Powers Analysis Process.
Again, these requirements are to apply to deliberate
planning, they will involve short-range time frames in
developing specific planning guidance. [Ref. 16: Part III,
JSE-J046,p. 1]
d. COA Development
The COA Development capability will help the
supported commander develop, test and select COAs based on




This function will prepare the approved COA for
implementation. The process will develop a detailed and
fully integrated plan involving mobilization, deployment,
employment, and sustainment activities. Because of the
speed at which this plan can be developed, it will only be
created when required and not for every approved COA.
f. Implementation
The implementation function will enable
decision-makers to monitor and analyze actual events and
compare them to scheduled plans, thus enabling decision-
makers to make more accurate adjustments when necessary.
g. Simulation and Analysis
Simulation and analysis applies the automated
analytical tools to the assessments and forecasts conducted
in the other JOPES functions. The intelligence required to
support this process will consist of the aggregate of all
intelligence resources supporting the other functions.
Though a small subset of the entire system, an example of
current simulation and analysis prototypes within military
Logistics include: [Ref. 17:p. 6]
• Industrial mobilization.
• Bulk Fuel.







• Logistics Aspects of Modern Aids to Planning (MAPP)
.
• Personal Computer Logistics Capability Estimator
(PC-LCE)
.
• Feasibility Analysis and Transportation Evaluator
(FATE)
.
3 . Information Availability
Information availability will be achieved by the
JOPES Intelligence (JOPES-INTEL) Interface. It will provide
the means for interoperability within and between the
operations and the intelligence communities during the
planning for and the execution of joint operations. [Ref.
18: p. 1-7] The current focus of JOPES-INTEL is on the
Threat Identification phase. To fulfill initial
requirements of unified and specified commanders, data
integration from multiple systems and respective databases
will be required to form the JOPES Intelligence Integrated
Database (JIIDB) [Ref. 19]. Interoperability of the
numerous subsystems is being made possible through current
endeavors in achieving DoD data standardization between the
joint planning agencies.
a. WISDIM
The WWMCCS Information System JOPES (WIS-JOPES)
Data Administration program is establishing standardized
data elements to enable joint planning system developers to
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utilize interoperable data elements in the development of
JOPES subsystems. This is absolutely required to ensure
effective and efficient joint communications throughout
WWMCCS and in developing user-unique applications. There
exist today over 6000 system required data elements in the
joint planning arena. Through standardization and
eliminating redundancy, JOPES will require less than 1000
data elements [Ref. 19]. To facilitate proper
standardization, the WWMCCS Information System Dictionary
for Information Management (WISDIM) and PC (Personal
Computer) WISDIM have been designed to be the data
administrator's tool for a central repository of
standardized data elements.
WISDIM will be used on mainframes as the
repository for several system data dictionaries such as
JOPES, DoD, DIA, Air Force, Navy, etc. WISDIM for personal
computers/work stations, WISDIM PC "is an automated data
dictionary with emphasis on data information about data
elements contained in multiple existing Joint Operation
Planning and Execution Systems." [Ref. 18 :p. 1-25] Simply
stated, PC WISDIM will contain the JOPES data dictionary and
be located on local personal computers as an off-line
system.
PC WISDIM will be included in the 44.5 megabyte
removable cartridge drive as part of the WIS Workstation.
The data dictionary will function on an Oracle database
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management system to assist the user easy access to the data
element standards. To maintain functional and data
currency, these cartridges will be updated approximately
every three months. [Ref. 19]
The WIS Data Dictionary will comply with
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards for
an Information Resource Dictionary System (IRDS) [Ref. 20:p.
D-5] .
b. WWMCCS ADP Modernization (WAM)
Current and future capabilities of JOPES will
function on the WWMCCS currently being updated/modernized by
the WAM program. The increasing amount of data within
WWMCCS, the growing complexity of questions being asked by
users and the changing nature of the collection and use of
data has resulted in a strong need for effective,
centralized data administration [Ref. 21:p. 1-3].
Modernization of the existing WWMCCS standard ADP is
required to ensure that more timely and accurate planning
along with command and control is made available to the
national, theater and supporting levels of command. By
installing modern software (e.g., JOPES), the latest
database management systems and intelligent workstations,
WAM will be able to support JOPES functional modules,
related software systems, and global telecommunications.
Commanders at updated command and control sites using
Distributed Processing System-8 (DPS-8) mainframes will
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access and send information via a modern information system
that will support these and future capabilities. This can
only be achievable on a single interactive, interrelated
global system with current information technology.
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V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF MILITARY PLANNING
Chapter II described the JCS planning process, and
Chapter III dealt with the probable causes leading to
insufficient planning advice. The proposed JSPS and JOPES
designed to enhance planning, were summarized in Chapter IV.
The changes that have made and those being proposed are
significant, but the guestion remains: Will JOPES and the
proposed JSPS be enough to enhance joint/integrative
planning within the JCS ' s strategic planning process? And
if not, what other areas, including IT, must be addressed to
improve planning? This chapter discusses and analyzes those
areas of change within the JCS organizational structure/
procedures and IT that will improve military planning and
those, in this author's opinion, that will continue to
restrict the planning process.
Definite improvements have been made to the planning
process by making the CJCS principal military advisor,
increasing NCA planning involvement, consolidating the JSPS,
upgrading IT, improving the system development process and
increasing system interoperability.
A. ANTICIPATED IMPROVEMENTS
The passing of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the
proposed changes in the JSPS and the development of JOPES
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can be considered monumental contributions to improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of DoD planning. The last
major DoD reorganization effort occurred in 1958 under
President Eisenhower [Ref. 5:p. 12], and the last primary
information system developed for deliberate planning is
1960s technology that was updated in the early 1970s [Ref.
6:p. 121]. Considering these efforts are nearly 30 years
old, the efforts by Congress, JCS and DCA will make marked
improvements involving the JCS organization/procedures and
IT in the following ways.
1 . Organizational Improvements
The Goldwater-Nichols Act, that resulted from the
well prepared 1985 Senate Staff and CSIS Reports, and the
recent JSPS change proposals are changes that intend to
improve numerous DoD planning deficiencies. Three
significant improvements to be noted: the identification of
the CJCS as principal military advisor; the increased NCA
planning involvement; and the consolidation of the JSPS
process.
a. CJCS as Principal Military Advisor
The Goldwater-Nichols Act identified the CJCS as
head of the JCS and principal military advisor to the
President, National Security Council and Secretary of
Defense. The law also gives the CJCS principal authority in
managing the Joint Staff which previously was assigned to
the corporate body of the JCS [Ref. 6:p. 34].
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Such provisions were needed to allow for a
stronger, more independent CJCS. He now has the positional
authority to make and formally present appropriate decisions
regarding integrative military strategy [Ref. 6:p. 34]. The
provisions also enable him to give better guidance to the
Joint Staff that is independent of the Services, e.g., the
Service Chiefs [Ref. 3:p. 15].
b. Increasing NCA Planning Involvement
The Goldwater-Nichols Act directs the President
to transmit annually to Congress, in a classified and
unclassified form, a comprehensive report on the national
security strategy of the United States [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT
1075] . It also directs the Secretary of Defense, after
approval of the President and consultation with the CJCS, to
submit annually to the CJCS, written policy guidance for
developing and reviewing contingency plans [Ref. 9: p. 100
STAT. 996]. This is a positive step to ensuring that the
President and Secretary of Defense, the absolute leaders of
DoD, will provide clear and specific strategic guidance and
objectives needed to enhance planning unity and integration.
c. Consolidation of JSPS
The proposed changes regarding the JSPS
consolidates several reports into a more streamlined and
understandable planning process. The number of inputs
required of the previous planning phase of the PPBS (see
Appendix C) made it difficult to perform any amount of
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integration during the complicated process. The new
process, because of more unified efforts and conceptual
simplification, will allow for better questions to be asked
that will result in better integrated answers.
2 . Management of IT
DCA, JCS and "joint" Service efforts to improve IT
management at the CINC and JCS level are commendable. It is
the opinion of this author that organizational and
procedural changes can not be totally effective unless the
management of information technology is properly conducted.
These efforts include significant improvements involving the
systems being delivered by changing IT system development
methodologies which has improved the interoperability of DoD
information systems.
a. Upgrading IT
The JOPES and WAM programs, now being managed by
DCA, upgrade much of the IT that dates back over ten years.
The advancement in IT during the 1980s has been accomplished
faster than anyone thought possible. The investments made
in modern technology will soon allow senior decision-makers
to gather, analyze, manipulate and disseminate relevant
information. The functions, used to support missions
required to fulfill national objectives, will be achieved by
tele-conferencing, simulation and analysis, decision support
systems and graphics display of enemy regions/cities/streets
on a real-time basis.
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Initially, it can be counted on that "JOPES will
cut across established organizational lines of responsibili-
ty to achieve the close coordination of DoD and other
federal sector components needed for compatibility of
procedures." [Ref. 6:p. 256].
b. Updating System Development Methodology
The DCA and JCS recognized the need to change
the JOPES program design methodology from a more
"traditional," e.g., System Development Life Cycle (SDLC)
,
method to the Prototype system design methodology. This
will more efficiently develop the over 80 functional support
elements derived from over 600 system requirements [Ref.
16:p. 1]. The prototype methodology will have numerous
advantages for the JOPES project:
• Prototyping allows requirements to be refined and
technology upgrades to be included without necessitating
a complete program restart.
• The design by prototyping delays the tremendous amount
of paper documentation that would normally be required
in the requirements definition and design specifications
until the delivery phase.
• The project development risk is substantially decreased
by being able to make iterative improvements, improve-
ments that come directly from increased user involve-
ment. This is especially important with a large project
involving a long life cycle.
• Prototyping will allow top officials who are not
directly involved with JOPES and not familiar with the
latest information technology, to see the growth of the
project and the potential applications.
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c. Improving System Interoperabilty
Though system interoperability is still a
problem that is addressed later, critical steps have been
taken to create necessary standards to insure interopera-
bility within the JOPES program. Hardware system
acquisitions have been made requiring that the globally
located sites maintain compatibility. Also, establishing
software, such as WISDIM and PC WISDIM that J-7 is highly
involved with, will allow data elements located at any site
to be received, updated and/or transmitted to any other
JOPES workstation much quicker because the data elements
will not have to be re-defined. Data standards are
necessary to eliminate the large number of local,
unintegrated databases that currently exist. [Ref. 19]
B. REMAINING PROBLEMS
Despite the substantial improvements in the DoD planning
process, it is the contention of this thesis that there are
continuing problems concerning the JCS organization,
planning procedures and IT that prevent DoD strategic
planning from reaching the potential required for a more
efficient and powerful military organization. These
problems include the following.
1. Emphasis on Operational Planning to the Detriment of
Strategic Planning
DoD continues to emphasize operational planning to
the point which few changes are made that will improve
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strategic planning. The two types of planning, strategic
and operational, are defined as follows.
Strategic planning can be defined as the process of
identifying goals, analyzing the environment, identifying
threats and opportunities, formulating strategies and being
able to implement integrated programs/plans that are capable
of being adjusted to environmental changes. Broadly
described, it is comprised of three fundamental processes,
an analytical or creative process, an organizational process
and an implementation process, integrated to form a unified
planning process [Ref. 22:p. 313]. Structured as a sequence
of activities within a specific timetable, these processes
represent an attempt to integrate the planning and
implementation of goals, objectives, tasks and requirements.
Operational planning, on the other hand, focuses on
more specific goals and objectives and involves the non-
integrative extrapolation from current programs and
resources to develop plans to meet particular requirements.
This process assumes current trends will continue and does
not take into consideration possible external or internal
environmental changes.
Because of the reasons listed in the sections to
follow, JCS ' s ability to conduct integrative strategic
planning that cuts across Service lines still will not be
possible. Services continue to have enough political
strength to receive approval for Service-oriented programs.
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Also, policy guidance from the NCA has not specifically
directed changes such as CJCS performing more as Service
integrator, eliminating dual responsibilities of Service
Chiefs and focusing more on planning instead of budgeting.
These reasons all affect DoD's inability to conduct
integrative/strategic planning needed to conduct successful
joint operations.
2 . Lack of Policy Direction from NCA
There has been a lack of clear and specific guidance
given by the President and/or the Secretary of Defense
regarding strategic planning. President Reagan's 1987 and
1988 reports on national security strategy were an effort to
reverse that trend, however, prior to these reports,
formulated national policy and/or objectives that are both
coherent and cohesive had rarely been given to the JCS. The
JCS previously had to extrapolate national policy from the
President's state of the Union message, press releases,
committee meetings, etc. [Ref. 5:p. 25] The 1987 and 1988
reports were not comprehensive or specific enough to either
list prioritized national objectives or transmit in a
classified form which the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires.
Additionally, President Bush has yet to submit such a report
for 1989. [Ref. 10:p. 2]
The planning guidance required from the Secretary of
Defense to be submitted to the CJCS provides only policy
guidance for the preparation and review of short-range
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contingency plans. Such guidance is needed, but it fails to
supply mid-range or long-range strategic guidance needed for
JCS to develop the necessary plans and programs during the
PPBS. [Ref. 8]
3 . Lack of an Integrated Database
There does not exist a Service integrated database
or standard data elements for JCS action officers/planners
to access during the planning process or during the
development of JCS views. "Generally, because the Service
staffs are larger and have data and analysis not available
to the Joint Staff, the Joint Staff action officer must rely
a great deal on Service staff contributions." [Ref. l:p.
156] Therefore, the JCS planners are unable to develop
accurate and/or timely reports because of the excessive time
needed to communicate with Service action officers,
combatant command joint staff counterparts and other JCS
staff members. [Ref. l:p. 177]
Unintegrated databases also affect JOPES testing and
evaluation. Despite JOPES' impressive outputs and the ease
of use demonstrated during the 1989 JOPES conference, the
data used on prototypes was customized data, tailored
specifically for each particular prototype. These proto-
types will be evaluated at the field level as part of the
prototyping process, but the prototypes will not be able to
be truly tested without access to actual data. If
customized or a tailored set of data is used, an accurate
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performance evaluation needed for project enhancements will
not be possible.
4 . Insufficient Planning Experience, Training and
Analytical Tools
Joint Staff planners still lack the experience/
knowledge, training and analytical tools to produce
independent, accurate, integrative and timely planning
analysis. "The Joint Staff rarely attracts officers with
such skills, even under the new Joint Specialty Officer
Program mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and until now
it (Joint Staff) has done next to nothing to generate the
necessary specialized knowledge." [Ref. 3:p. 17]
The Goldwater-Nichols Act places emphasis on
recruiting more capable personnel with more joint
experience. But the Joint Staff action/planning officers
are still not required to have any prerequisites prior to
his/her joint tour such as formal military training in joint
planning/operations, training regarding other Service
capabilities/limitations and training involving the use of
the joint planning information systems. Lack of sufficient
training, knowledge and analytical tools to evaluate answers
and alternatives leaves the planners highly dependent on
Service oriented information and analysis [Ref. l:p. 18].
With the amount of time required to learn other
service missions/capabilities, the joint planning process
(including the cumbersome and time consuming staffing
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process discussed in Chapter II) and the analytical means to
conduct joint planning, it is easy to see without proper
training and experience why planners are ill-prepared for
joint duty [Ref. 12:p. 1-4].
5. JCS Overload
The process of developing JCS advice for a request
from the NSC, NCA, CINCs, or Services or for a particular
JCS planning document are too numerous, extremely laborious,
too time consuming and fail to produce meaningful
recommendations on issues involving more than one Service.
These type of results have encouraged senior civilian
leaders to rely on civilian staffs for information that
should be provided by JCS. [Ref. l:p. 157] Some have
stated that the JCS system is not organized or operated to
effectively perform these operations [Ref. l:p. 158]. This
may be illustrated by the fact in 1986 nearly 20,000 policy
papers were reviewed. One issue involved the participation
of the Secretary of Defense and took several months to
resolve whether or not skimmed milk should be sold in
military stores. [Ref. 2:p. 336]
6. CJCS Not Fulfilling Integrator Role
The CJCS has not begun to fulfill the role
envisioned by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and provide
essential integrated advice to his superiors or to the JCS
and CINCs. He has primarily acted as spokesman for the
individual CINCs and has not integrated the plans and
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programs as a whole. This has been primarily the fear of
becoming a competitor of the CINCs and Service Chiefs and
losing their support, for the CINCs and Service Chiefs could
easily utilize their independent lines of communication to
the Secretary of Defense and Congress. [Ref. 3:p. 12]
The Goldwater-Nichols Act has given the CJCS
complete authority over the Joint Staff, eliminating the
Joint Staff from working for both the CJCS and the Service
Chiefs. The Joint Staff is the CJCS ' s primary integrating
tool and a strong Joint Staff producing strong guality
products is a critical element in the CJCS realizing his
role as integrator and not just a spokesman. Being able to
fulfill the role as an effective integrator, thus overcoming
the traditional Service oriented goals and programs, will
take complete and specific top-down support from the
President and Secretary of Defense, not just from the CJCS.
[Ref. 3:p. 16]
7 . "Dual-hattinq" by Service Chiefs
The Service Chiefs still maintain a conflict of
interest by having dual responsibilities, "dual-hatting."
They are responsible for joint planning recommendations to
the CJCS and managing and leading his respective Service.
[Ref. l:p. 166] A Service Chief's responsibility to lead
his Service precludes his agreement to joint planning
recommendations that are inconsistent with plans and
programs supported by his Service [Ref. 4:p. 16]. The
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Goldwater-Nichols Act did not direct any changes that would
solve the dual-hat function of the Service Chiefs. They
still have the joint role and yet must possess the highest
interest of their respective service to maintain service
support.
Part of the problem involves the Service Chiefs
having the potential of losing the support of their
respective Service if they subordinate the interest of their
parent Service to the larger interests of national defense,
just as the CJCS has the potential of losing the Service
Chiefs support by focusing on integration of service roles.
This obvious conflict of interest is considered as the
primary cause of the deficiencies of the JCS planning
system. [Ref. l:p. 6]
8 . Over-emphasis on Budgeting
There is an over-emphasis and control on short-term
budgeting during the PPBS [Ref. l:p. 620]. Virtually every
line item of the annual budget goes through at least three
reviews within each Congressional chamber. These intense,
yet redundant reviews that are directed on the short-term
budget prevents Congress, JCS and OSD officials from
focusing on other important issues such as strategic
planning priorities and allocating appropriate resources
towards those resources. [Ref. 4:p. 31]
Even though the tight budget control by Congress has
encouraged a more centralized DoD involvement, it has also
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prevented the DoD to determine or plan for critical,
integrative type resources that may be required in the
future, i.e., eight years that the proposed NMSD projects
[Ref. 5:p. 26].
In this author's opinion, this over-control has
resulted from a budget problem during the previous
administration. Increasing DoD budgets were not applied to
integrative planning. "Service wish lists took the place of
Joint Strategic Planning Documents, with budget plans 'no
more than POMs that were stapled together, one right on top
of another.'" [Ref. 2:p. 288] This enabled the "reach" of
the Services to out-weigh the "realism" to the point where
the pendulum has swung to where even the possibility of
integrative planning has been stifled.
9 . Improper IT Management Structure
IT within the DoD is controlled by the wrong DoD
agency. The upper level IT management within the DoD still
maintains the same structure as it did 20 years ago. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) still has
ultimate authority concerning IT in the DoD [Ref 23 :p. 4].
Unfortunately, IT today is not only significantly different
than it was 20 years ago but, the strategic use of IT
focuses on a completely different dimension. No longer are
computers fed by computer cards to automate data processing
in such areas as financial accounting. IT is a critical
asset in gathering, manipulating and disseminating
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information, especially for the real-time requirements
required by the CINCs, JCS and NCA.
A comptroller traditionally places emphasis on cost-
benefit analysis involving price strategy of potential
programs. Many of the cost/benefits analyses are difficult
to establish precise monetary figures and result in "soft"
numerical figures. This type of management structure
representation can not focus on the growth strategy of
future IT requirements. The result is an undercutting of
the operational level inputs to develop IT and programs like
JOPES to maintain a competitive edge.
10. Under-utilization of JOPES
The scope of the JOPES program is not being applied
high enough in the planning process to solve the
inadequacies of JCS strategic planning. So far JOPES only
involves short-term strategy planning, e.g., the strategy
determination phase contained in deliberate planning, and
not yet incorporated into the JSPS. The JOPES Functional
Description Document illustrates that JOPES will: "Assess
Threat. Develop Enemy/Friendly Situation for the Mid-Range
Period. Input to Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)."
[Ref. 7:p. 4-26] Yet, the same document states in several
definitions involving JSPS (mid-range planning) documents
that it (the document) "has limited opportunity to be
integrated into JOPES." [Ref. 7:p. 2-8]. It appears, at
least to this author, that there are conflicting opinions
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concerning the possible applications of JOPES. A critical
problem exists in strategic planning, and JOPES could
possibly enable the JSPS process to be more efficient, if
its use were expanded to include mid-range planning.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The focal point of this thesis is centered upon a major
problem that degrades United States military operations
—
ineffective military planning/advice from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. Legislative action of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
Act attempted to resolve this problem by restructuring the
top levels of the JCS. But the Act did not consider a major
root of the planning problem: information mismanagement due
to the lack of efficient information systems necessary for
today's planning.
The speed and wide-spread availability of modern weapon
systems is requiring planning of military operations for
future contingencies be conducted in less and less time. But
the ability to decrease planning time is becoming more
difficult because of increasingly scarce resources, the
increase in government micro-management and dissimilar
Services attempting joint operations with outdated and
incompatible information systems. To maintain the
competitive edge against potential enemies that possess
weapons equal to ours, information retrieval, analysis and
dissemination by decision-makers must be better and faster.
This chapter reviews the original research questions,
identifies findings resulting from this thesis and then
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addresses recommendations that will further improve JCS
strategic planning and advice.
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research questions developed in Chapter I were
divided into three areas regarding DoD planning: problems,





• What are the major problems with the joint planning
efforts by the JCS?
• What areas, that pertain to Information Technology (IT),
have prevented DoD from accomplishing timely and quality
planning?
2 Changes
• What changes have been made to correct the problems with
JCS planning?
• What do the planning systems look like with these
changes?
• Who has been affected by these changes?
3 Analysis
• Are the changes that have been made, or that are in the
process of being made, sufficient to solve improper
planning that is causing less than satisfactory
performances during military operations?
• Specifically addressing the mismanagement of
information, how has the delay in upgrading current
information systems effected the methods in planning?
• And what areas of IT, relating to management and




Recent U.S. military operations have consistently failed
to demonstrate effective joint Service operations, despite
"the principal organizational goal of DoD...," "the
integration of distinct military capabilities of the four
Services to prepare for and conduct effective unified
operations in fulfilling major U.S military missions."
[Ref. l:p. 2] It was determined that a critical cause of
less than outstanding joint military operations was the
insufficient planning and advice from the JCS
.
1 . Recent Changes
The most significant change implemented thus far to
address this problem was the Goldwater-Nichols Act passed in
1986. This Act was the first major reform to be legislated
in over 30 years. It directed DoD to make numerous
organizational and procedural changes that would reorganize
DoD, strengthen civilian authority, improve military advice,
place more authority and responsibility on CINCs for the
accomplishments of missions, increase attention of strategic
and contingency planning, improve joint officer management
policies and other purposes [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT. 992].
An important change involving the JCS planning
process has also been developed, although not implemented.
In an effort to improve the military planning process, the
JCS, specifically J-5, recently has proposed a revision of
the current JSPS process. The JSPS is a key to the
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"planning" phase of the PPBS process and has received much
criticism that it has not effectively contributed to the
PPBS.
Another important change is the JOPES program,
designed to update the current deliberate planning system,
JOPS . A project that started over ten years ago, JOPES will
apply the tremendous advances in computer hardware and
software technology to a system that has consistently been
criticized as being slow, difficult to learn and operate,
inoperable with other systems and missing many joint
oriented functions critical to the short-range planning
conducted by combatant commanders.
2 . Positive Outcomes
The Goldwater-Nichols Act, the JSPS proposal and the
JOPES project have made, and will make significant
improvements to, the DoD planning process. These changes
will enable the JCS to begin crossing Service lines in order
for integration of distinct Service capabilities to take
place. The following changes briefly point out these
improvements.
a. NCA Planning Involvement
The President is now required to submit annually
to Congress, a comprehensive report on the national security
strategy of the United States [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT 1075].
Also, the Secretary of Defense is now required to submit
annually, to the CJCS, written policy guidance for the
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preparation and review of contingency plans [Ref. 9:p. 100
STAT 996] These two changes are part of the specific top-
down guidance addressing national goals and objectives
required for a coordinated effort by the DoD [Ref. l:p. 7].
b. CJCS: Principal Military Advisor
Strategic military advice was previously given
by the JCS as a corporate body. The Goldwater-Nichols Act
now assigns the CJCS as the principal military advisor to
the President, NSC and Secretary of Defense. This allows
for a more independent CJCS that will strengthen the CJCS '
s
ability to present prioritized cross-Service advice to the
NCA and NSC. [Ref. 3:p. 9]
c. Joint Staff Under CJCS
As per the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Joint
Staff is now managed by the CJCS vice the corporate body of
the JCS. The Joint Staff will no longer encounter the
Service oriented pressure of the Service Chiefs during
planning. In assisting the CJCS in his duties and
responsibilities, the Joint Staff will be more independent
in providing unified strategy of the combatant forces,
military operational advice for unified command and
integration of the armed forces into a unified efficient
team [Ref. 9:p. 100 STAT 1010].
d. Revised JSPS
The revised JSPS proposed by J-5, illustrated in
Appendix D, would consolidate numerous documents that are
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currently required. It would also simplify, at least
conceptually, the overall JSPS planning process. By
implementing a more manageable process, the planning phase
of the PPBS would be more effective in providing mid-range
"strategic" planning guidance. [Ref. 14]
e. Enhancing Deliberate Planning
The JOPES program, once completed, will update
the current deliberate planning systems, JOPS and JDS, with
modern computer systems hardware and software [Ref. 6:p.
251]. JOPES will give the combatant commanders the ability
to receive and transmit real-time information, and also
reduce the time required to develop OPLANs to 4 5 days
(currently requiring 12 to 24 months to develop) and reduce
OPORD development to three days. [Ref. 6:p. 253] This
capability is achievable through efforts by 3-1 to create
data element standards that will allow the different joint
planning Services and agencies to communicate and share
critical planning information.
3 . Continuing Problems
The DoD, consisting of over five million active
duty, reserve and civilian employees, is the largest and
most complex organization in the Free World [Ref. l:p. 14].
Since it has been over 30 years since the last reform
measures were conducted, the studies conducted in 1985 were
able to identify many uncorrected problems within the DoD.
Because of the large number of problems and the tremendous
80
size and complexity of the DoD, it is unimaginative to think
that recent changes are the "cure-all" to the problems that
have been identified. Therefore, problems discussed in
Chapter V continue to effect the planning process either
because the changes failed to address these problems or
because the changes were inadeguate. These problems are
summarized below.
a. Problems Not Addressed
The problems that remain have a significant
impact on the military planning process and the ability to
integrate Service capabilities. Some of these problems
exist because the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the proposed JSPS
revision and the JOPES program have failed to address them.
These include:
• Over-emphasis on budgeting [Ref. l:p. 620].
• "Dual-hatting" responsibilities of the Service Chiefs
[Ref. l:p. 166].
• Inadeguate analytical tools for JCS planners to perform
accurate and timely planning [Ref. 3:p. 17].
• Mismanagement of DoD IT [Ref. 19].
b. Problems Inadeguately Dealt With
The changes implemented thus far have failed to
adeguately solve particular problems, therefore allowing
some of these problems to continue. These problems include:
• Lack of sufficient national strategic guidance from the
President and the Secretary of Defense [Ref. 8].
• Continued by-pass of the formal planning process [Ref.
2:p. 341].
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• Lack of Service integration by JCS [Ref. l:pp. 12-18].
• Lack of an integrated database, IT and IT management
standards to implement one [Ref. 19].
• Insufficient planner experience and training [Ref. 3:p.
17] .
• Improper JCS response to requests [Ref. 2:p. 336].
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
This section presents recommendations that would improve
the JCS planning process based on the analysis conducted in
Chapter V.
Recommendation : Ensure the President conforms to the
Goldwater-Nichols Act in transmitting annually, in a
classified and unclassified format, a comprehensive report
on the national security strategy that includes specific
policies and objectives for large and/or small joint
military operations.
Rationale : This recommendation would address the need
for having specific, comprehensive national strategic
guidance from the President that has yet to be effectively
given. [Ref. 10:p. 3] Specific objectives and goals would
enhance the achievement of a coordinated effort toward these
goals by the various DoD components [Ref. l:p. 7]. Also,
written Presidential guidance requiring JCS joint planning
and operations is the forum needed to strengthen the
integrative authority of OJCS, specifically CJCS, to
82
overcome the dominance of Service oriented goals that JCS
has not been able to overcome.
Recommendation ; The President and Secretary of Defense
should demand and use integrated advice from the CJCS.
Rationale ; By demanding integrative advice from the
CJCS, the CJCS would no longer have to fear the possibility
of the Service Chiefs using alternative channels of
communication to the NCA to reinforce Service interests or
gain approval of Service oriented programs/plans. If the
NCA can dictate the primary objective of joint planning then
"the CJCS • s constituency will become the Secretary of
Defense, not the CINCs or the service chiefs or anyone
else." [Ref. 3:p. 45] The services would have to work with
the JCS, not around them. Full support by the NCA would
help eliminate the traditional political strength of
individual Services and the traditional dependencies within
the JCS that has contributed in preventing effective Service
integration.
Recommendation ; Increase JCS planner education and
training by ensuring:
• The joint-specialty program recruits quality officers by
increasing "joint-specialty" visibility within the
Services. There also must be evidence proof that joint-
specialty personnel will have a high rate of promotion
and an attractive career path.
• JCS and Service planners be required to attend a
comprehensive joint planning course that would include
learning other Service capabilities/limitations, JCS
planning process and use of analytical tools. [Ref.
12:p. V-20]
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Rationale ; The quality of personnel actually performing
research, analysis, development and implementation of
military plans is still a critical requirement no matter
what the organizational structure and procedures. JCS
planners must have the ability to "acquire and analyze
critical information about force capabilities and
requirements and produce independent, integrated findings"
for the CJCS , despite having little service cooperation.
[Ref. 3:p. 50] Because of the lack of joint planning
experience, the amount of data to be analyzed and the lack
of analytical tools, the task of learning how to perform as
a joint planner is taking too long [Ref. 12:p. IV-16].
Considering normal tour lengths of three or four years, the
fact that it sometimes takes between one and two years for
planners to learn the joint planning job to an effective
level is unsatisfactory.
Recommendation ; Add the analytical tools contained in
JOPES functional capabilities to the Joint Staff for use in
JSPS planning.
Rationale ; The JOPES Intel-Interface will contain
global intelligence that could be oriented toward the
development of several JSPS documents, thus improving the
ability of JCS planners to collect and analyze information
during their planning process. The functions of JOPES are
to significantly improve the deliberate planning process by
having enhanced functional capabilities and receiving
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continuous global intelligence from numerous sources. By
being able to guickly access global, strategic information,
the processes and functions applied to deliberate planning
could also be used by JCS planners to develop JSPS
documents. Therefore, JOPES would support both strategic
planning (JSPS) and deliberate planning. Figure 4 shows
this relation, and also the sequential development process
of specific documents within each planning system.
Reductions in planning time and increases in quality options
are predicted to occur with the unified and specified
command level planning process. If the same results can be
applied to the Joint Staff planners in their JSPS process,
then the quality and timeliness of information going to the


























Figure 4. System Relationships
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Recommendation : Move the management of DoD IT away from
the ASD(Comptroller) and create an ASD(CIS) (Computer
Information Systems) to manage IT.
Rationale ; IT entails a completely different strategy
today than it did 20 years ago. It no longer consists of
just accounting/cost analysis functions and strategy.
Today, IT is a very real part of the growth and success of
military planning and operations, and is crucial for DoD to
remain a competitive edge on possible adversaries. To
achieve these objectives, the IT responsibility must be
taken away from the cost/analysis strategy experts within
ASD(C) and given to ASD(CIS)
.
Recommendation : Give J-7 Assigned Responsibility
Authority (ARA) to dictate the establishment of data element
standards to DoD joint planning Services and agencies.
Rationale : To enable JOPES functional information
systems to possess more efficient interoperability
capabilities, data standardization is necessary. The number
of data elements contained in individual databases is
increasing everyday. But, thus far, data elements standards
have not been directed to be established, and the capability
of interoperability between information systems is getting
much more difficult to achieve.
Recommendation : Change the annual President's national
budget to a biennial national budget.
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Rationale : The over-emphasis on the short-term annual
budget and the rigorous reviews it encounters has stifled
much of the strategic planning capabilities attempted during
the JSPS and the PPBS . Increasing the budgeting cycle to
two years would decrease Congressional control of budgeting,
give planning and programming more credibility and return to
the DoD the ability to plan for future critical programs
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DEFINITIONS
The following are definitions/comments that have been
used throughout this thesis:
• Budget Estimates: Budget estimates are submitted by
Service and DoD agencies based on approved programs from
the PDM and the most recent estimated fiscal guidelines.
• Chairman's Guidance (CG) : Initial top-down guidance
provided from the CJCS for the framework for the
development of strategy options and the NMSD.
• Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) : Head of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the principal military advisor
to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense. He
may, and does, consult with other JCS members and
combatant commanders in formulating military advice. He
then presents the range of advice received from the
other JCS members to the NCA. He is the communication
link between the NCA and the combatant commanders. The
CJCS also acts as spokesman for the combatant commanders
concerning requirements, programs, and budgets. [Ref.
6:p. 34]
• Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) : The CJCS '
s
assessment of the Service POMs to see if the
capabilities are sufficient to implement developed
national strategy, including operation plans.
• Concept Plans (CONPLANs) : An operation plan in concept
format.
• Defense Guidance: The document that the Secretary of
Defense issues to the DoD military agencies for the
development of their POMS. The DG includes firm
guidance on goals, priorities, objectives and fiscal
constraints. [Ref. 15:p. xiv]
• Deliberate Planning: Formalized military operational
planning that involves the short-term time frame. It
begins upon receiving a planning task, i.e., JSCP from
the JCS, and ends when a plan has been approved. [Ref.
7:p. 2-9]
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• Issue Papers (IPs) : Consist of possible alternatives or
disagreements resulting from POMs submitted from the
Services and DoD agencies. After the DRB selects the
issues to be reviewed, they are collected by OMB and the
Services (with inputs from JCS and CINCs) to form Issue
Books (IBs) . The DRB makes final resolutions of the
issues which are recorded in the PDM.
• Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) : A planning
document prepared for the Secretary of Defense by the
CJCS, with participation of the JCS, CINCs and the
intelligence community, that assesses the U.S. military
capabilities and compares them with those of possible
adversaries. The JMNA covers a five year time frame,
e.g., 1989 JMNA examines 1990-1994.
• Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) : A biennially
published document that initiates the Joint Operation
Planning Process (JOPP) and the deliberate planning
process. It provides guidance to theater level
commanders for the development of CONPLANs and OPLANs in
order to be able to accomplish specific tasks based on
short-term military resources and capabilities. [Ref.
6:p. 321]
• Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) : Initiated with
the development of national military goals, objectives
and strategies, it is the formal process that enables
the CJCS to carry out his responsibility in developing
and furnishing strategic direction to the Armed Forces
[Ref. 6:p. 321]. It also provides assessments, resource
allocations and planning guidance to military planners.
• Joint Strategy Review (JSR) : A review that initiates
the JSPS cycle to assess the threats or potential
threats and current DoD strategy. Inputs are received
from the Services, CINCs, NCA and intelligence sources
such as DIA.
• National Command Authority (NCA) : Consists of the
President and the Secretary of Defense who by law are
the only individuals with the authority to order troop
movement or to direct the Armed Forces for the execution
of military action. [Ref. 6:p. 25]
• National Military Strategic Document (NMSD) : Formerly
the JSPD, a planning document issued biennially by the
JCS that gives strategic planning and force structure
advice to the President, National Security Council and
the Secretary of defense in order to support national
objectives. The NMSD also serves as the foundation for
development of DG. [Ref. 15 :p. xvii]
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• National Security Council (NSC) : An organization
designed to assist the President in national security
policy. The statutory members are the President, Vice
President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.
The CJCS, Director of the CIA and the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs serve as
advisors. [Ref. 15:p. xxi]
• National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) : A direc-
tive issued by the President, via the Secretary of
Defense, to the JCS at the beginning of the adminis-
tration and thereafter when required. The NSDD involves
the President's decision on national policies,
objectives, strategies and forecasted budget levels.
• Operation Plan (OPLAN) : A plan developed by a unified
or specified commander for conducting military
operations in a hostile environment. OPLANs are
developed in response to tasks assigned by the CJCS and
may be used as a basis for an OPORD. [Ref. 6:p. 329]
• Operational Planning: Focuses on specifying goals and
objectives and translating them to programs and budgets
in order to determine plans required to meet the
specified goals. It does not account for possible
environmental changes, i.e., it extrapolates from the
current conditions and resources. [Ref. 17 :p. 4]
• Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) : An
element within DoD that includes the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Joint Staff and the agencies of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. In the role of formulating military
advice, the JCS does not have executive authority over
combatant forces. The chain of command is from the
President to the Secretary of Defense and from the
Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. [Ref.
6:p. 32]
• President's Budget (PB) : The document the President
sends to Congress each January estimating the national
budget, and recommending desired appropriations in
detail for the upcoming fiscal year. [Ref. 6:p. 332]
• Program Budget Decision (PBD) : The PBD is formed after
thorough review hearings by OSD, DRB, OMB and JCS staff
members concerning the military department's budget
submissions. The Military departments conduct
presentations and answer questions as necessary during
these hearings.
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• Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) : The DRB's final
decisions involving Service POM issues that are in turn
distributed to the DoD components for the formulation of
Budget Estimates.
• Service Chiefs: The Service Chiefs, the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) , Commandant of the Marine Corp (CMC)
,
Chief of Staff for the Army (CSA) and the Chief of Staff
for the Air Force (CSAF) offer advice to the President,
NSC, and Secretary of Defense and are responsible, to
the respective Service Secretary, for the management of
that Service. The Service Chiefs are also responsible
for appointing Operations Deputies of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (OPSDEPs) and Deputy Operations Deputies, JCS
(DEPOPSDEPs) who work with the Director and Vice
Director of the Joint Staff. The OPSDEPs and DEPOPSDEPs
consider the less important issues or screen the major
issues to be forwarded to the JCS. [Ref. 6:p. 36]
• Service Program Objective Memorandum (SPOM) : Recommen-
dations from the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of
Defense that includes proposed applications of their
portion of DOD appropriations. [Ref. 6:p. 333]
• Strategic Planning: Analyzes an organization's external
and internal environment and searches for new trends,
uncertainties and viable options in order to adapt to
future contingencies. It integrates an organization's
goals, policies and action plans into a unified plan as
well as formulating and allocating resources required
based on organization objectives and potential
environmental changes. [Ref. 17 :p. 3]
• Strategy and Option Decision (SOD): The President's
decision regarding the military strategies proposed by
the SOR. The President's decisions are then
incorporated into the DG.
• Strategy and Option Review (SOR) : Conducted by the
Secretary of Defense to review developed military
strategies and force recommendations contained in the
NMSD, after which are forwarded to the President.
• Strategy Option Assessment/Review: An iterative process
conducted by JCS to develop mid-range national military
strategies/options and assess the optimal fit relating
to required capabilities. The results are submitted as
inputs into the NMSD.
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APPENDIX A
STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
(Title 10, Section 141)
• Prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic
direction of the armed forces.
• Prepare joint logistic plans and assign logistic
responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with
those plans.
• Establish unified commands in strategic areas.
• Review the major material and personnel reguirements of
the armed forces in accordance with strategic and
logistic plans.
• Formulate policies for the joint training of the armed
forces.
• Formulate policies for coordinating the military
education of members of the armed forces.
• Provide the representation of the United States on the
Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
• Perform such other duties as the President or the
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED AND DIRECTED CHANGES
(not all inclusive)
A. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 198 6
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff; Composition; Functions
• The CJCS is to be the principal advisor to the
President, NSC and Secretary of Defense.
• Other members of the JCS are military advisors to the
President, NSC and Secretary of Defense.
• The CJCS shall, when he considers appropriate, consult
with and seek advice of the other JCS members and the
commanders of the unified and specified commands.
• The CJCS shall, as he considers appropriate, inform the
President, NSC and/or the Secretary of Defense of the
range of military advice and opinion concerning a
particular matter.
• Members of the JCS may submit to the CJCS advice or
opinions that disagree to the advice or opinion that the
CJCS presented to the President, NSC and/or Secretary of
Defense.
• The CJCS shall establish procedures to ensure that his
own advice is not delayed due to the submission of
advice from other members.
• The members of the JCS, individually or collectively,
give advice to the President, NSC and/or the Secretary
of Defense when reguested to do so.
• After first informing the Secretary of Defense, any
member of the JCS may make recommendations to Congress




• May attend and participate in NSC meetings, acting in
his role as principal military advisor.





• The Vice Chairman, appointed by the President, can not
be a member of the same service as the CJCS.
• Serve for a term of two years and may be appointed for
two additional terms.
• Must have the joint specialty code and have served at
least one joint duty assignment as a general or flag
officer.
• May participate in all JCS meetings, but may not vote
unless acting as Chairman.
4. Joint Staff
• The CJCS manages the Joint Staff and the Director of the
Joint Staff. The Joint Staff shall perform such duties
as the CJCS prescribes.
• The Secretary of Defense shall ensure the Joint Staff is
independently organized and operated to support the CJCS
in providing unified strategic direction of the
combatant forces for an integrated and efficient team of
land, naval and air forces.
• The Joint Staff shall not have executive authority.
• Total number of members, armed forces and civilian,
shall not exceed 1627.
B. SENATE STAFF REPORT: "THE NEED FOR CHANGE"
1. OJCS
• Disestablish the JCS allowing Service Chiefs to dedicate
all their time to Service Duties.
• Establish a Joint Military Advisory Council consisting
of a Chairman and a four-star officer from each Service.
• Reduce Service staffs involved in joint planning to no
more than 25 military officers from each Service.
• Establish the DRB in statute with appropriate Service
representation.
• Authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory
Council to provide military advice in his own right and
to independently manage the Joint Staff.
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Designate a Deputy Chairman for the Joint Military
Advisory Council.
Specify that one of the Joint Military Advisory Board's
responsibility is to inform higher authority of all
legitimate alternatives.
Specify a statutory relationship between the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Military Advisory Council, Joint
Staff and OSD.
Make the Joint Military Advisory Council and Joint Staff
part of OSD.
Require members of the Joint Military Advisory Council
have substantial joint experience.
Authorize the Chairman to specify staffing procedures of
the Joint Staff.
Authorize the Chairman to develop and administer a
personnel management system of joint duty officers.
Establish a joint duty career path for each Service.
Strengthen the requirement for joint duty for promotion
to flag or general rank.
Authorize the Secretary of Defense to approve extensions
of joint tours past four years.
Eliminate the size restriction of the Joint Staff.
Require the Secretary of Defense to do a comprehensive
study of the General Staff concept.
The Secretary of Defense promulgate planning guidance
for contingency plans, and develop a continuing exercise
program to test such plans.
C. CSIS REPORT ON DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
• Designate CJCS as principal military advisor to the NCA
and NSC.
• The CJCS, with Joint Staff assistance, provide force
planning recommendations based on policy and realistic
resource projections by the Secretary of Defense.
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• The role of the under secretary of defense for policy
should be expanded to include responsibility for program
integration on a mission basis.
• Establish a third under secretary with broad oversight
responsibilities for functions relating to operational
forces readiness.
• Reduce the size of OSD staffs.
• Shift to a biennial budget to streamline the
congressional review process and focus on broader
national strategic priorities.
• DoD should develop a long-range capital investment plan
for better cost projections for major weapon systems.
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APPENDIX D
FUNCTIONS OF THE CHAIRMAN. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The CJCS is the principal military adviser to the
President, National Security Council and Secretary of
Defense. Subject to the authority, direction and control of
the President and Secretary of Defense, the CJCS is
responsible for the following principal functions:
Strategic Direction
• Assist the NCA in furnishing strategic direction of the
Armed Forces.
B. Strategic Planning
• Prepare strategic plans, including plans that conform to
resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to
be available during the time frame the plans are
effective.
• Prepare and joint logistic plans and mobility plans to
support those strategic plans.
• Perform net assessments of the capabilities of the Armed
Forces and its allies cas compared to potential enemies.
C. Contingency Planning
• Provide for preparation and review of contingency plans
and advise on critical deficiencies and strengths in
force capabilities.
D. Reguirements, Programs, and Budget
• Advise the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of
reguirements of the unified and specified commands.
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• Advise the Secretary of Defense that primary and
alternate program recommendations and budget proposals
conform with priorities in previously established
strategies.
• Assess military requirements for defense acquisition
programs.
E. Doctrine, Training and Education
• Develop docrine for joint employment of the armed
forces.
• Formulate policies for coordinating military education
and training.
• Formulate policies for joint training of the military.
F. Other Matters
• Exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff.
• As directed by the President, attend and participate in
meetings of the NSC.
• Advise and assist the NCA on establishing combatant
commands.
• Transmit communications between the NCA and combatant
commands.
• Review plans and programs for adequacy and feasibility.
• As appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the
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